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EUROPE:
A CIVILIZATION ON THE EDGE
by Peter O'Brien
Political Science
Trinity University
San Antonio, TX 78212
pobrlen@trinity.edu

Our European culture is one that has staked its all on
the universal and the danger menacing it is that of
perishing by the universal.
Jean 8audrillard1
INTRODUCTION
Remi Brague rejects common charges of Eurocentrisim leveled
against Western civilization. He prefers to characterize the West as
"eccentric," meaning off center. He equates Western civilization with
Europe and understands it as that civilization which grew out of the
western half of the Roman Empire and with time differentiated itself
from Byzantine and Islamic civilizations (themselves successors to the
Roman heritage). He labels Europe eccentric because it stands (physi
cally and figuratively) on the edge of its professed universal core.
Ancient Greece and Christianity comprise that core. Following Leo
Strauss, Brague employs the symbols of Athens and Jerusalem, "Its cul
ture comes down to two elements that cannot be reduced to one anoth
er. These two elements are the Jewish and the later Christian tradition,
on the one hand, and the tradition of pagan antiquity on the other.
'Athens and Jerusalem' has been proposed as an expression to symbol
ize each of these currents with a proper name."'2
Curiously, neither core city has historically been considered part of
Europe.3 This marginality, Brague insists, runs much deeper than mere
geography. Rome derived its culture and institutions from Greek
Hellenism and Europe its civilization from Roman. Europeans have had
then only indirect or secondary access via Rome and Latin to Ancient
Greece and Greek. Similarly, the Christian God made His Covenant, not
with Europeans, but with Jews in their language. "Christianity is to the
old Covenant what the Romans were to the Greeks.

The Christians

know - even if they are constantly in danger of forgetting, as they have
done on several occasions - that they are grafted onto the Jewish people
and onto their experience of God."• Greeks feel directly connected to
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God because the good news of His Incarnated Son was spread and can
onized in their language in (for the Greeks) the superior New
Testament.' But Europeans were left with only secondary linguistic
access to both Holy Scriptures. "The Church is 'Roman' because it
repeats the operation carried out by the Romans in regard to Hellenism.
but in relation to Israel.'06
Brague claims that this "Roman attitude" or state of "secondarity"
has saddled Europe with a profound "feeling of inferiority" dating to its
inception.7 As a result, Europeans have felt themselves uncomfonably
situated (geographically but even more so culturally) somewhere
between absolute knowledge, understood as Hellenic and Christian uni
versalism, and barbarity, a state of ultimate ignorance and irrelevance.
European attempts to escape this awkward liminality "between the
uphill classical and the downhill barbarity" have found expression in
repeated

renaissances

(e.g.,

twelfth

century,

Quatrocentro,

Reformation) designed to appropriate the core culture by perfecting it in
the West as well as in conquests to recapture core territories (e.g.,
Crusades, modem imperialism).'
As I read it, Eurocentrism belongs with these effons to re-center
Europe,

though less by recovering the

core than shifting it.

Eurocentrists depict a modern world with Europe at its center. The
adjective "modern" is important. Serious Eurocentrists, at least since
the Pirenne thesis,9 no longer assert an uninterrupted progression from
ancient Athens through Rome onto Florence, Paris and finally to
Brussels today. They acknowledge that during the Middle Ages Europe
sat on the edge of more powerful empires, more vibrant economies,
more sophisticated cultures to its east to which Europeans had only tan
gential and conditioned access. Modernity, beginning roughly in 1500,
changed all that. Through cultural renaissance (e.g., science), political
reform (e.g., democracy), economic dynamism (e.g., capitalism), and
military domination (e.g., imperialism) Europeans crafted a modem
iteration of their civilization that became the world's central axis.•0
I contend below that judged by their own subjective standards

modem Europeans failed to re-center the modern world around Europe.
Thus, even if such a re-centering in fact transpired, Europeans were not
fully convinced of. it. They continued to fret over their marginality and
secondarity. I provide two types of support for my thesis, indirect and
direct. First, l mine recent anti-Eurocentric scholarship for actual devel
opments known to educated Europeans which must have belied
European centrality. Second, l highlight prominent Europeans who
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expressed doubt over Europe's unrivaled greatness. Modem Europeans,
it turns out, were never quite as smug vis-a-vis rival civilizations as
Eurocentrism suggests
RIVALS TO THE EAST
Let us not lose sight of the deep sense of inferiority with which
Europeans entered the modem age. Throughout the Middle Ages, they
repeatedly either directly experienced or heard tales of larger empires
(e.g., Abbasid, Mongol, Ottoman), fiercer warriors (e.g., Saladin, Jingiz
Khan, Mehrned the Conqueror), speedier religions (e.g., Islamic con
versions), wiser savants (e.g., Avicenna, Averroes, Maimonides), love
lier cities (e.g., COrdoba and Constantinople), finer products (e.g., silk,
glass, pottery), tastier foods (e.g., oranges, bananas, rice, sugar) all ema
nating from the east." Put differently, if Europeans were to reach a sense
of superiority, they had a long road to travel.
The year 1492 or thereabouts suggests itself as a good starting point
for that journey to self-confidence. In that year the Spaniards expelled
the Muslims once and for all from the Iberian Peninsula, and Columbus
discovered the New World. Twelve years earlier Ivan Ill had thrown off
the Tartar yoke. And in 1497 Vasco da Gama rounded the horn of Africa.
Furthermore, the Renaissance was by that time in full flower and
spreading its potent pollen well beyond Italy. As the epithet "rebirth;;
implies, Europe began emerging from its "Dark" or "Middle" Ages to
take center stage in world history, Whatever its exact origins, moderni
ty is invariably understood by Eurocentrists as an age dating to some
where around 1500 and characterized by "The Rise of the West,"12 "The
Origins of the "European World-Economy,"13 or simply "The European
Miracle."••
The Russians may have slipped out from the Tartar Yoke in 1480,
but the rest of Christendom remained imperiled by the menacing Turk
untH as 1ate as 1683 - the last siege of Vienna. Near the close of the fif
teenth century, the Ottomans, long feared only as a land power, fortified
their navy and expanded their control of the Mediterranean so that
Europeans traded only on Ottoman tettns - not vice versa.i5 Between
1499 and 1503 the Turks defeated the venerable Venetian fleet to enter
the Gulf of Corinth, captured Lepanto, and forced Venice to pay annual
tribute to the Sublime Porte.16 They captured Rhodes in 1522, Algiers in
1529, Tripoli in 1551! Cyprus in 1571 and Tunis in 1574.1' These victo
ries secured a naval monopoly in the eastern Mediterranean (not to
mention the Black Sea") for the Ottomans and enabled the likes of the
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legendary Barbarossa to menace the southern coast of Europe, thus
practically nullifying the pacification of the Arabs in 1492." Tales
spread through Europe of Christian women enslaved and fattened up on
bread dipped into syrup to enhance their salability.20
For nearly a century the Europeans could do little to halt Ottoman
naval gains. In fact, the young zealot, Loyola, had his heart set on mis
sionary work in Jerusalem in 1537 but had to settle for Rome due to
Ottoman control of sea routes (So thank the Turks for the Jesuits!).21
Don John of Austria finally made a stand at Lepanto in 1571. Though
touted by Europeans as a victory of Crusade-like proportions - Ali
Pasha's head was ceremoniously mounted on a spike on the prow of+ a
Turkish vessel while the crescent was replaced with a cross - the result
hardly turned the Mediterranean into a European lake or the Ottoman
Empire into a vassal. Rather, the two foes reached a naval stalemate of
sorts. Hans Khevenh Iler, who fought at Lepanto, seemed to realize as
much in noting in his dairy that the touted victory failed to secure a sin
gle additional yard of territory for Christianity.22
Venetian Senator, Costantino Garzoni, who authored a report of his
travels to Istanbul after Lepanto, wrote of the sultan: "This most pow
erful emperor's forces are of. two kinds, those of the sea and those of the
land, and both are terrifying." The Grand Turk continued to have the
power "to torment all of Christendom.''Zl
In 1573 the Venetian ambassador to the Ottoman capital reported
back to his government that the sultan lay poised to establish universal
monarchy: "the Ottoman emperor has in the course of continuing victo
ries seized so many provinces and brought so many kingdoms under his
yoke and, in so doing, has made the whole world fear him, it is not
beyond reason to wonder if he might not finally go so far as to establish
a universal monarchy." The next ambassador insisted that it would be
vain to think the Turks could be stopped (barring divine intervention).
It should be added that these diplomatic reports were subsequently pub
lished (in French too) and widely read throughout Europe well into the
seventeenth century.2A
As indicated, the Turks continued their ravaging campaigns on
land. In 1499 they again occupied Otranto and then used that foothold
to maraud villages surrounding Venice. Small wonder that Machiavelli
lauded the discipline and morale of Turkish troops over and beyond that
of Christian soldiers.:is Large numbers of European plebeians came to
believe in the prophesy that they would be overrun by the Turks - a sen
timent Luther felt compelled to denounce in his "War Sermon" of
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1529.2'6 Meanwhile, the learned debated a controversy started in 1551 by
a Jewish author, Rabbi Isaac Abravanel, who contended that the
Ottomans were fulfilling the Prophesy of Daniel. The legend foretold
that a universal monarchy of God on earth was destined to follow in the
wake of the four great ancient pagan kingdoms (Babylonian-Assyrian,
Persian, Greek and Roman).:11
Even half-hearted Ottoman excursions into Europe proved success
ful. In a series of Danubian campaigns the Turks first captured Belgrade

(1521) and from there crossed the Hungarian plain to lay (unsuccessful)
siege to Vienna in 1529. The Habsburgs were forced to tolerate in
Hungary, long the critical buffer zone between them and the Turks, the
Ottoman puppet regime of John Zapolyai. Over the ensuing decades the
Turks lay poised to swallow up all of St. Stephen's dominions, includ
ing Buda in 1541, and beyond into southern Ukraine and Lithuania.
Ferdinand I stopped the advance only by brokering a deal in 1562
whereby Hungary was partitioned into three parts - two loyal to the
Turks.21 The Treaty of Adrianople six years later brought further embar
rassment to the Habsburgs, who were forced to pay annual tribute to
Istanbul. Selim II generously referred to it as a "gift" to spare
Maximilian II humiliation.l9
In this milieu, Venetian ambassadors to the Porte understandably
reported back home that the Turks "are the greatest fighters in the
world," utterly "invincible." "Henceforth, all Christendom should fear
incurring a great extermination.")II Things looked so dire that a French
poet in 1555 exhorted Europeans to abandon their continent to the Turks
and re-establish Europe in the New World.31 Five years later compatriot
Guillaume Postel published his widely read De la republique des Tures,
in which he concluded that France could only def eat the Turk by emu
lating him.»
The Europeans had effectively accepted

a border between

Christianity and Islam in the very heart of Europe.33 The Ottomans
remained a thorn in Europe's side for at least another century. They raid
ed as far north as Poland in 1620,14 then again in 1672.3s They took the
Western Ukraine from the Poles in 1676 only to lose it to the Russians
in 1681.36 Most Europeans interpreted Halley's comet of 1682 as a
divine signal of defeat at the hands of the Turks. The latter seemed to
fulfill the prophecy the next year by laying final (but again failed) siege
to Vienna. As late as the tum of the eighteenth century Sir William
Temple called the Ottoman Empire "the fiercest. . .in the world."37
That said, there is no denying that 1683 marked the end of further
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Ottoman advances into Europe. Here began the gradual degeneration of
the Turk into the "sick man of Europe," who had to submit to such dis
advantageous settlements as the Treaty of Kuchak-Kainardji (1774).
But keep in mind that the Turks took Crete from the Venetians in 1715,
converted countless Christians to Islam, and did not relinquish the
"miniature continent" until 1898.)1 The Ottomans also managed to
repulse the Russians in 1711 and the Austrians in 1736-939 and again in
1787.40 The Balkans remained under Ottoman control until the nine
teenth century. It was not without good cause that Metternich said of the
road leading east out of Vienna, "Asia begins at the Landstrasse.""
With the infidel constantly banging at their doors, Europeans took
to scrutinizing the enemy. What they saw at the Porte impressed them.
European diplomats, who regularly referred to European realms as
"kingdoms" but the Ottoman as "empire," marveled that the sultan
"rules in Asia, in Africa, and in Europe" in this "vastissimo impero dei

Turchi." Istanbul was widely held to be the world's most splendid city,
"the most beautiful thing in the world there is to see."•2 Moreover, the
sultan, or more accurately the Grand Vizier, controlled a gigantic, effi
cient and wealthy administrative apparatus in comparison to which
European bureaucracies paled.0
Nothing garnered more attention in the reports of European diplo
mats than the stunning fact that the sultan's revenues regularly exceed
ed expenses (in one report by 30 percent, another 47percent)... If that
were not enough, the sultan had both the aristocracy and the clergy
firmly under his thumb - things of which European princes could hard
ly boast." "Obedience, considered by all to be the most solid foundation
for any empire, maintains this one without a doubt," noted Antonio
Errizo in his 1557 report on the Porte. "Revenues, peoples, and obedi
ence," wrote Marco Minio in 1522, these were the sultan's key "pow
ers."46
It speaks volumes that Europeans, not Turks, called Suleyman "the

Magnificent" and the sultan generally "the Grand Signor."" But the
greatest compliment that could possibly be paid to the Turkish monarch
was to acknowledge him as the rightful heir to the Roman Empire. In
Methodus adfacilem historiarum cognitionem (1568) Jean Bodin con
cluded:
It would be far more just to regard the Osmaoli sultan as the
inheritor of the Roman Empire, for it was he who, after cap
turing the imperial city of Byzantium from the Christians,
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went on to conquer from

the Persians that region of

Babylonia which is spoken of in the Book of Daniel, adding
to the ancient provinces of Rome all the land across the

Danube until the

banks of the Borysthenes ... we must rec

ognize that the prophecy of Daniel can be most appropriate
ly interpreted as applying to the sultan of the Turks...

Fifty-three years earlier Machiavelli counseled his prince that true
greamess came only to those rulers "who command their expeditions in
person as the Roman Emperors did in the beginning and as the Sultan
.

does at the present time."•9 If we look to the future instead of the past,
we might say with Lucette Valensi that Europe's relations with the
Turks were
not unlike those between much of the world and the United
States in the period since the end of the S econd World War.
The political, economic, and military hegemony of this new
power - this youthful imperialism - may be ill abided,
but its achievements and its political regime dazzle and fas

cinate nonetheless. One might wish that it had less power,
but no one thinks to challenge its legitimacy.'°
As with America today, fashion often followed wealth and power
then. Davies notes a "craze for Turkish styles and artifacts in sixteenth
"

century Europe.)• Through the eighteenth century European aestheti
cians claimed the most beautiful people were to be found in the
Ottoman Empire

$1

.

European rulers continued well into the seventeenth

century the practice of sending envoys to the Levant with instructions
to bring back materials of academic importance (The Turks sent no such
envoys in the other direction.). Scholars the likes of Leibniz and Racine
could not wait to study what the scouts retrieved." Man y chairs of
Arabic were formed in European universities, beginning with Paris in
1529. Persian and Turkish studies followed.

It was Muslim control of the Mediterranean that forced the
Portug uese and Spanish to take the circuitous routes to Indi a that led
them deep into the Indian and Atlantic Oceans and the "Age of
Discovery." In the Americas small bands of Europeans easily overthrew
whole empires like the Aztecs and Incas. They went on to found and
expand colonies and spread European lang uage, culture and religion
among the In dians. This experience cle arly enhanced the European self
image and even helped assuage some of the shame ste mming from loss
es to the Turks.�
The experience in Asia differed markedly. When da Gama rounded
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the horn of Africa, he "entered a highly sophisticated trading area" full

of "hostile ...Muslim rulers or traders in all the harbours which he visit

ed."�$ He only managed to navigate his vessel to India with the help of
a Muslim pilot who knew the waters.'6 Wherever the Portuguese docked

they found Muslim vessels already moored there.. Furthermore,

Christian wares "were crude and unattractive in Eastern eyes."" When

da Gama returned to Lisbon in April 1499 and showed his king what he

had acquired, the monarch replied: "it would seem that it is not we who
have discovered them, but they who· have discovered us."$8

European backwardness was to be expected. After all, the

Europeans hailed from an impoverished economy in comparison to the

prosperity, even opulence of Asia. Fernao Mendes Pinto seemed to con
firm so much after his visit to the Orient between 1521 and 1558. There

he walked the markets of Peking "as if in a daze" at the quantities of

"silk, lace, canvas, clothes of cotton and linen, marten pearls, gold-dust

and gold-bullion." "All these things were to be had in such abundance

that I feel as if there are not enough words in the dictionary to name

them all."S9

Over a century later the Director of the British East India Company,

Sir Josiah Child, stated the obvious when he noted that Indian "trade

with all the Eastern nations... is ten times as much as ours and all the
European nations put together.''60 As late as 1750 the rest of the world

still out-produced Europe and North America by a ratio of nearly 4 to

1.61 India's GDP still tripled Britain's.62 This vast economic advantage

goes far in explaining why "from 1500-1800 relations between East and

West were ordinarily conducted within a framework and on terms estab
lished by the Asian nations."63

The geo-political climate was nothing like that in the Americas. In

the Mogul and Ming empires the Europeans encountered truly mighty

powers unlikely to succumb like the Aztecs and Incas. In fact, the
Europeans were too busy expressing their awe and wonder of these
majestic

Oriental

kingdoms

to

imagine subduing them.64 The

starry-eyed newcomers were lucky if the emperor even condescended

to tolerate them within the realm.6$ Such things contemporaries knew

thanks to the virtual "flood tide" of literature about the Orient that

washed over Europe from the sixteenth century on.66
European r
eaders enjoyed marveling at descriptions of exotic

places such as the grand Mogul court at Agra or the lavish Burmese

metropolis of Pegu with its ten thousand elephants.61 Geographies typi
cally described Asia in glowing terms. "It was vast in size, rich in prod-
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ucts, the seat of great monarchies and the cradle of the ans and the sci
ences." Cicero's remark that "Asia is truly so rich and fertile ...(that) it
easily surpasses all lands" frequently turned up.61 India earned accolades
like "the best and goodliest land in the world" or "an earthly paradise.''69
Until the nineteenth century it was not uncommon for Britons stationed
in India lo adopt Mughal culture, even convert lo Islam.'° CuhuralJy,
these Europeans were light years away from the arrogant Tohomas
Macaulay, who in the nineteenth century claimed one shelf of English
literature superior to all that had ever been written in lndia.11
But no land bewitched Europeans quite like China. Commissioned
by Pope Gregory XIll in 1583, Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza's Historia
de las cosas mas notables, ritos y costumbres de/ gran Reyno de la
China (1585) molded Europeans' image of the Ming and Ch'ing dynas
ties. He divided "this mightie kingdome .. .into fifteen provinces, that
every one of them is bigger than the greatest kingdome that we do
understand to be in all Europe.'172 In the seventeenth century Isaac
Vossius typified European amazement with Chinese science: "If any
man should make a collection of all the inventions and all the produc
tions that every nation, which now is, or ever has been, upon the face of
the globe, the whole would fall short, either as to number or quality, of
what is lo be met with in China."'3 English SinophiJe, Sir William
Temple, deemed it "endless to enumerate all the excellent orders of this
state, which seem contrived by a reach of sense and wisdom, beyond
what we meet with in any other government of the world."74
From the time of the first successful Jesuit mission in 1583 until the
rebuke of Lord Macartney's trade mission in 1793, China mesmerized
the European mind. Hundreds of boo ks by European visitors to Asia
were published back home. Of this body of literature Donald Lach and
Edwin Van Kley write: "Few literate Europeans could have been com
pletely untouched by it.'17' Philosophers the likes of Montesquieu,
Quesnay, Fontenelle, Diderot, Rousseau, Leibniz, Bayle, and Voltaire
idealized China as a veritable philosopher-kingship and used its exam
ple to heap scorn on benighted European ways.76 Philologists keen to

reform crude European vernaculars praised Chinese as a "paragon of
linguistic rationality."
Artists embraced Chinese styles as a refreshing break from hide
bound European conventions.n Chinoiserie became the preferred deco
rative style in homes.,. Sages sought to establish Chinese academies on
European soil.19 Officials envied the mandarins' uncontested authority.
One of Louis XV's ministers averred that what France sorely needed
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was "an injection of Chinese spirit.'"° Leibniz had counseled Louis'
father: "...everything exquisite and admirable comes from the East
Indies ...Learned people have remarked that in the whole world there is
no commerce comparable to that of China."" Adam Smith concurred as
late as 1776: "China is a much richer country than any pan of Europe"
(and he saw no change on the horizon).n And Napoleon hoped to trans
fer his base of operations to the Orient because "Europe is a molehill.
All great revolutions and empires have been in the Orient."11
RIVAL TO THE WEST
Awareness of Oriental grandeur notwithstanding, evidence o f a
westward shiftjn the world's locus of power mounted during the eigh
teenth century.· The Europeans, however, expressed fear that the shift
was moving too far west, namely to America. America, not Europe,
would become the place where the achievements of the modem era
would be most fully realized. As far back as colonial times, Americans
were predicting and Europeans dreading this very outcome. The premo
nitions especially crescendoed after 1776.
With the American Revolution the upstart republicans began
sculpting a fully distinct society that threatened to become the envy of
the world. Put differently, Nonh America gave Europeans a glimpse
into a likely future - one in which Europe would not predominate. We
might say America robbed Europeans of their own sense of preemi
nence in the very years when the world's axis did tum around Europe.
If Islamic civilization represented to Europe the classic archenemy,
America came fonh more like a rookie teammate who threatens some
day to bench the squad's star player.
The American Revolution hardly overturned Britain, let alone
Europe

-

a reason hidebound Europeans refuse to label it a "revolu

tion." The rebels did not emerge victorious until 1783 (and only with the
help of the French) and did not really neutralize the British until the
Treaty of Ghent in 1815. Economically the United States remained in a
"classical imperial relationship" with Britain, exporting raw materials,
most notably cotton, and importing manufactured goods." And, of
course, the young bastard republic never invaded Britain or any other
inch of Europe until the twentieth century.
But the defiant Americans did invade Europe's psychic space.
Britain Jay poised after vanquishing the French in 1763 to become the
largest empire on the planet since the Roman. Continental Europeans,
even the French, took to admiring and emulating mighty England.16 The
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Americans burst the British bubble. It was generally admitted in Europe
that American independence signaled the complete abolition of the
entire European colonial system. " George III seemed to have sensed so
much in 1781 when he remarked: "the dye is now cast whether this shall
be a great Empire or the least dignified of European states.""
The ramifications of the War of Independence extended further.
Success made it impossible for Europeans confidently to dismiss
America's caddish self-aggrandizement. From the time the first pil
grims touched shore, American braggarts shamelessly boasted the
prospects of their new homeland with such claims as establishing a
"new Jerusalem" or "city on a hill." Tom Paine boldly predicted that
"What Athens was in miniature America will be in magnitude. The one
was the wonder of the ancient world; the other is becoming the admira
tion, the model of the present."89 Edmund Burke agreed, if reluctantly:
"Nothing less than a convulsion that will shake the globe to its centre
can ever restore the European nations to that liberty by which they were
once so distinguished. The Western world was the seat of freedom until
another, more Western, was discovered; and that other will be probably
its asylum when it is hunted down in every other part.'"°
Burke was not alone. By as early as 1760, according to English
ciergyman Andrew Burnaby, the idea that the crux of history had moved
from the Middle East to Europe and was headed west was widely held.
"An idea strange as it is visionary, has entered into the minds of the gen
erality of mankind, that empire is traveling westward; and every one is
looking forward with eager and impatient expectation to that.�estined
moment, when America is to give law to the rest of the world." ·voltaire
seemed to concur when he wrote of "that golden age of which men talk
so much and which probably has never existed anywhere except in
Pennsylvania.•><n So did Horace Walpole: "The next Augustan age will
dawn on the other side of the Atlantic.''9)
The American Revolution turned any remaining heads in Europe
that had hitherto ignored America. European visitors flooded into the
United States as if into a zoo to see an exotic creature: democracy.94
Most of them sent letters back home and even published their observa
tions - so many, that early in the nineteenth century publications on
America comprised "a major share of the European publishing indus
try.'095
"From St. Petersburg to Lisbon" Europeans heard sung the praises
of the maverick republic.96 From Switzerland: "I am tempted to believe
that North America is the country where reason and humanity will
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develop more rapidly than anywhere else.'997 From Venice: "If only the
union of Provinces is preserved, it is reasonable to expect that, with the
favorable effects of time, and of European arts and sciences, it wilJ
become the most formidable power in the world.'998 From Norway:
"God help America to fight its way to liberty that mankind may not per
ish in serfdom.''99 From Poland: "only Americans in the whole world
have the right to celebrate [freedom];" Europeans "are crushed whether
by chains at home or by foreign bonds; from the Tiber to the Volga peo
ple groan in fetters."'00 From Germany: "America, you are better off.
than our continent, the Old."101
Nowhere, of course, did news of.the American Revolution ripple as
in France. Countless Frenchmen rallied behind the American rebels
with declarations like that of Anne Robert Jacques Turgot in 1778:
"They are the hope of the human race; they may well become its
model."'02 Four years later Crevecoeur labeled the United States "the
most perfect society now existing in the world."103 The list of admirers
stretches far: Lafayette, Chastellux, Robin, Due de la Rochefoucauld,
Condorcet, Lameth, Dumas, Comte de Seguer, Vkomte de Noailles,
Saint Simon, Du Pont, Mirabeau, Pierre Louis, Comte de Roederer,
Adrien Duport, Abbe Sieyes, Guy Jean Target, Talleyrand.'°' Needless
to say, America had its detractors in France, but they comprised the
minority.'°'
The French Revolution drew hopeful attention back onto Europe.
After all, the American Revolution took place on the edge of the civi

lized world. By contrast, the French struggle on behalf of Liberte, Egal

ite, and Fraternite transpired in the very heart of civilization. The

momentous political event seemed poised to realize the ideals of the
Enlightenment and usher in a new modem epoch with Europe in the
vanguard. In the end, of course, the French Revolution dashed more
hopes than it inspired. It failed where the American Revolution succeed
ed, namely in the promotion of liberty and democracy, and stormed a

path

toward despotism, whether progressive or reactionary, that bas

tardized Europe's experience with modernity. The facts are well known:

Declaration of the Rights of Man

and the Citizen (1789),

abolition of

monarchy and establishment of the republic (1791), Robespierre's

"Reign of Terror" ( 1793-94), coup d'etat of Napoleon Bonaparte

(1799), establishment of Empire and Emperor (1804), the defeat of
Napoleon and Bourbon Restoration (1814). In the meantime, the
Napoleonic Wars ravaged the continent, as Europeans everywhere were
forced to take sides with or against the Revolution.
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Because such elevated hopes attended the Revolution, its mutation
into tyranny occasioned profound gloom. A mood of disillusionment
spread over the continent.106 Friedrich von Gentz lamented:

"

The door

of hope seemed to me closed forever, to Germany and to Europe." For
"the men of the Revolution intended to unite all of the nations of the
earth in one great cosmopolitan confederation, but they succeeded only
in unleashing the cruelest world war that has ever shaken society and
tom it apart."1(77 William Wordsworth mourned "this melancholy waste
of hopes o'erthrown," while Chateaubriand felt "we are sailing along an
unknown coast, in the midst of darkness and the storm."'°' Edmund
Burke concluded:

"

The glory of Europe is extinguished."'""' Once

defeated and exiled to St. Helena, Napoleon reflected that he had tried
"to bring everywhere unity of laws, of principles, of opinions, senti
ments, views, and interests. Then perhaps it would have been possible
to dream for the great European family the application of the American

Congress or of the amphictyonies of Greece."110 George Friedrich Hegel

admitted that such hopes lay with "America ... the country of the
future... the land of desire for all those who are weary of the historical

arsenal of old Euro pe." 111

America did not disappoint. As the infant republic matured it
democratized much faster than Europe. To be sure. most of America's
founding fathers opposed democracy and preferred "natural aristocra
cy" in which an elite cadre of genuinely virtuous and visionary men
would wield the instrument of a strong centralized government to steer

the commonwealth in an enlightened direction. These Federalists failed
due to a wave of first Jeffersonian, then Jacksonian populism that
swamped elitism in America. Proponents of the two anti-Federalists
demanded expansion of the franchise, so that defacto universal (white)
male suffrage obtained by 1820. They used the ballot box not only to
put Jefferson in the White House in 1800 and Jackson in 1828, but to
elect countless hoi po/loi to public office at all levels.112
Success at the polls spurred more plebeians to vote. Turnout nor
mally hovered below 20 percent before 1828 but climbed thereafter to
over 70 percent."' Jackson, in particular, exalted the ordinary man and
helped spawn a general leveling in American society that extended far
beyond politics to social, religious and economic hierarchies."�
"Among the novel objects that attracted my attention during my
stay in the United States," wrote Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835, "noth
ing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of condition
among the people."115 The Due de La Rochefoucauld observed that
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even backwoods wretches "consider themselves on an equal footing
with the best educated people of the country, and upon the principle of

equality they intrude themselves into every company."116 Fanny
Trollope's popular Domes1ic

Manners of1he Americans of 1832 immor

talized the picture of America as a vast bog of equality and vulgarity
where the tasteless habits of the lowly asphyxiated the good manners of
the respectable. In 1851 Heinrich Heine echoed her ridicule of
America's equality:
I have sometimes thought to sail
To America the Free
To that Freedom Stable where
All the boors live equally.
But I fear a land where men
Chew tobacco in platoons,
There's no king among the pins,
And they spit without spittoons.m
Of course, slavery conspicuously stained America's democratic
fabric but was finally abolished in 1865.
In Europe democracy continued to flounder. Charles Tilly discerns
"no one-way path toward democracy to trace across Europe between
1815 and 2000. Almost every country that moved significantly toward
broad, equal, protected consultation [representation] during one period
or another veered back toward authoritarianism or petty tyranny during
some subsequent periods."'"
In 1848, in panicular, democratic revolutions broke out across
Europe and threatened to defeat inequality once and for all. As with the
French Revolution, however, European democracy was soon stunted. In
France Louis Napoleon trounced liberal opponents in the presidential
election of 1849 and then used the office to purge the government and
army of opponents, wheedled the National Assembly into disenfran
chising three million voters most likely to oppose him in 1850, staged a

coup de'eiat in 1851, and had himself declared emperor like his uncle
in 1852. The French emperor dispatched a regiment to Rome to crush
the newly declared Italian republic and reinstall Pope Pius IX. The
Austrian army had already choked the democratic forces of Piedmont,
a victory that paved the way in Tuscany and Lombardy for the return to
power of sovereigns who set about abrogating the constitutions of 1848.
With the help of the tsar's army, the Hapsburgs extinguished the
fledgling Hungarian Republic. Frederick William IV deployed troops to
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quell democratic agitation in Berlin in 1848 and in Saxony and Baden
in 1849. In Italy, Austria, and Germany, then, absolutist monarchy was
again firmly ensconced within two years. In France, a modern police
state had replaced democracy. Universal male suffrage would not reach
Germany until 1871, France 1875, Britain 1884, Austria 1907, and Italy
in 1912. Europe's second great experiment in democracy had, like the
first, foiled visions of a new modem democratic age ushering forth from

the Old World.
Modernity no doubt arrived in Europe in the nineteenth century, but
it was a modernity scarred by the lingering sores of the ancien regime.119
Flaccid democracy helps to explain why Europe's sharpest students of
society harmoniously predicted the inevitable failure of the political
ideology and structure. Writing at the close or turn of the nineteenth
century, Max Weber, Gaetona Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and Robert
Michels (the virtual fathers of sociology) each subscribed to a variant of
the latter's "iron law of oligarchy."
Meanwhile, in America widespread commercialization followed by
ubiquitous consumerism caused leveling in the economy akin to democ
ratization in politics. The three taken together elevated the common
man in ways he could only dream of in Europe and reali2e by immigrat
ing to America.
America earned a reputation as a place where one could quite liter
ally buy happiness. As far back as 1697, Sir Thomas Lawrence, secre
tary of Maryland, reported back to London, "they feed their Hoggs with
better than Dutchesses Eat in Hyde Park."110 A century later a German
immigrant wrote to her family back home that one could live "as well
as a count or prince can in all of Germany."121 Adam Smith claimed,
"there are no colonies of which the progress has been more rapid than
that of the English in North America."122
Favorable economic conditions so fostered commerce that by 18W
America had blossomed into a profoundly commercialized society in
which the ceaseless pecuniary pursuits of ordinary people predominat
ed in a way unparalleled elsewhere.123 This fact is sometimes lost on
those who associate commercialization with industrialization, which
sparked in America first in the second half of the nineteenth century. In
reality, America experienced massive "preindustrial" commercializa
tion as its people scattered across the continent brokering at every
turn. 124
During the first century of the republic the American market under
went a change from a focus on production for local sale (often through
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barter) to production for distant, eventually national sale (always for
cash). This transformation further opened the door for the onslaught of
consumerism beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
Amidst these changes the economy rapidly expanded, its annual rate of
growth doubling twice between 1812 and 1850 and reaching 3 percent
soon thereafter.125 By the 1840s New York City was the fastest-growing
large industrial area in the world.'26 The Big Apple, combined with
Boston, Balimore
t
and Philadelphia, mushroomed into an integrated
market that enveloped the Northeast. Like tentacles, roads, bridges,
canals, and rails reached out from these ports and carried their manufac
tured products into the hinterland. Trade on the Erie Canal multiplied
thirteenfold from the 1820s to 1850s. Though its first trains did not roll
until 1833,127 by 1840 America doubled Europe in rail mileage.128 To be
sure, Great Britain led the world in economic production throughout
much of our period, but America was constantly gaining ground,
expanding nearly twice as fast as Europe.129
By 1870 America's GNP equaled and by 1913 tripled Britain's.'io
By the 1890sAmerica led the world in manufacturing as well as in coal,
iron and steel production. By 1919 the United States cultivated and
manufactured more than the rest of the world combined. New York
replaced London as the world's financial center.m
Countless observers highlighted mammonism as Americans' most
defining traitm The Due de La Rochefoucauld, for example, deplored
in America "an immoderate love of money."133 Tocqueville had
observed that Americans are "swayed by no impulse but the pursuit of
wealth." Trollope held that no conversation took place in America with
out mention of the word "dollar." "Worldly pursuits," averred Heinrich
Heine, "are their true religion, and money is their God, their only
Almighty God." Dickens recalled from his visit that "all their cares,
hopes, joys, affections, and associations seemed to be melted down into
dollars." But it was left to Captain Marryat to make the most preposter
ous observation, maintaining that "dollar worship" affected Americans'
physiology and caused them all to look alike. Herbert Spencer later
advanced a similar argument.1"
Unremitting commercialization eroded America's class structure
and further differentiated it from Europe. Most notably, the lower class
lost its defining characteristic (in Europe): acceptance of its station in
life. America's poor and propertyless refused to settle for the status quo.
Though they did not always succeed, they remained optimistic that they
could one day prosper. As a result, America transformed into a middle-

68

Comparative Civilizations Review

class society rather than, as in Europe, a society with a middle class. The
values emerging from the middle class were taken to be universal rather
than specific. m "It happened nowhere else in the Western world quite
like this."'36 No wonder, then, that his opponents, before ultimately opt
ing for the guillotine, considered punishing Louis XVI by exiling him
to Philadelphia, where he would have to live out the remainder of his
life a drab and dreary bourgeois.m
But industrialization alone did not further distinguish America in
the world. After all, Britain's industrialization preceded and Germany's
and Japan's coincided with America's. But industrialization in America
did complete the establishment of. a truly integrated continental market.
Railroad companies, in particular, filled in the last holes in the nation's

monstrous infrastructure, by 1885 connecting not big cities (which were
already joined) but more significantly small towns like a Kewanee,
Illinois or an Aberdeen, South Dakota. This turned virtually all 56 mil
lion Americans into objects of mass marketing and distribution.us
The national market made an ideal breeding ground for con
sumerism. The tendency to evaluate life according to the products one
purchased arose toward the end of the nineteenth century and came to
dominate American life by the 1920s. Its influence stretched far outside
economics into politics, religion, science, culture and beyond. This con
sumerist "revolution" further propelled America past Europe as the
leader of modernity. Though industrialization surely deserves its place
in the list of attributes of modernity, consumerism has proven more con
sequential. 139 "The commodity became and has remained the one subject
of mass culture, the centerpiece of everyday life, the focal point of. all
representation, the dead center of the modem world.""° Certainly by the
end of the nineteenth century commentators like Thorstein Veblen,
whose Theor.j of the Leisure Class was published in 1899, realized that
the consumer was overtaking the producer as the most important eco
nomic actor in the modem world.1'1
America steered the juggernaut to consumerism not only because
of. its enormous market. After all, Britain, Germany, France, and Japan
for that matter, marketed their products beyond their admittedly small
er national markets. America led because it democratized consumerism
faster than competitors. Everywhere consumerism originated with the
urban middle classes.1•2 But in America it spread quickly (though hard
ly immediately")) down the social hierarchy and out into the country
side, becoming a shared national way of life. In Europe, by contrast,
entrenched forces, often the same ones that impeded democracy, slowed
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consumerism."'
Put differently, America's modem political claim to fame, democ

racy, aided in the establishment of its modern economic claim to fame,
consumerism. Indeed, Hannah Arendt disparagingly suggests that con
sumerism not only fed on, but virtually replaced democracy as
Americans became more enamored of the opportunity to consume than
vote:
The American dream, as the nineteenth and twentieth cen

turies under the impact of mass immigration came to under
stand it, was neither the dream of the American Revolution
- the foundation of freedom - nor the dream of the French
Revolution - the liberation of man: it

was. unhapp
il

y, the

dream of a "promised land" where milk and honey flow.
And the fact that the development of modem technology
was so soon able to realize this dream beyond anyone's
wildest expectation quite naturally had the effect of con
firming for the dreamers that they really bad come to live in
the best of all possible worlds."'
In keeping with the consumerist ethos, Americans did in fact con
sume more during these years. Already by 1879 production of consumer
durable goods was growing faster than producer goods.146 Increasingly
Americans elected to spend their earnings on what were once consid
ered luxuries. For instance, the years 1900-1929 saw a 161% boost in
spending on clothing (largely a necessity) compared to 199% on person
al care products (mostly luxuries); 168% on housing compared to 322%
on transportation (mainly cars); 164% on medical care compared to

285% on recreation."' Discretionary spending (beyond housing, cloth
ing, food) jumped from 20% to 35% during the same period."8
In all fairness, American consumers enjoyed an edge; they had
more money. Between 1925 and 1929, for example, real wages in
America exceeded those in Britain by 60%. Americans' incomes had
two-and-a-half-times the buying power of French. America also bene
fited from a steady stream of immigrants arriving with little more than
the clothes on their backs who needed and wanted to consume in order
to fit into the "American way of life." Understandably, Americans
bought more. By 1929, one in five Americans owned a car, one in 43
Britons, one in 335 Italians. "American prosperity gave quite ordinary
citizens cars, eiectric gadgets, telephones, and ready-to-wear fashions
for which European masses would have to wait until mid-century.""9
By this time, even though consumerism, like democracy. had its
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roots in Europe, consensus abounded on both sides of the Atlantic that
America represented the most advanced consumer society and that
quality gave it an economic advantage over its European rivals.150
European high brows eventually coined the term "Americanization" to
stand for the increasing number of concessions to consumerism they
witnessed at home. The concept of "Americanization" fully confirms
the advanced nature of consumerism in America. No one there was
referring to the phenomenon as "Europeanization." Europeans and
Americans alike recognized the USA as the undisputed leader in this
newest gestation of mass culture.
Understandably, then, nothing so incensed European intellectuals
than to have to watch the influence and appeal of raffish American man
ners expand. Consensus continued to form in Europe throughout the
nineteenth century that the future sided with America - for better or
worse. J.S. Mill deemed Tocqueville's

Democracy in America "all the

more worthy of study in that it harbors within its depths the future of the
world." Because of its capitalist potential, Marx called the United States
"the youngest and yet most powerful representative of the West." "'f.he
Americans may reasonably look forward to a time," Herbert Spencer
predicted in 1882, "when they will have produced a civilization grander
than any the world has known."
A few years later James Bryce maintained, "America has. . .antici
pated European nations. She is walking before them along a path which
they may probably follow."150 As Sigmund Skard concluded in his study
of European attitudes regarding America, "in the best minds ...there
was a dawning realization that 'America' was no longer just America,
but the spearhead of a general development, and that even the modem
United States could only be understood in a global perspective and in
the light of universal cultural problems."1s2
America seemed destined for economic supremacy. Englishman
Richard Cobden, as far back as 1835, deemed American management so
superior that "our only chance of national prosperity lies in the timely
remodelling of our system, so as to put it as nearly as possible upon an
equality with the improved management of the Americans."1si
America's reputation as a house of ingenuity grew as it churned out crit
ical modem inventions from the steamship (1807) to the telegraph
(1832), to the telephone (1876), to the aero plane (1903). 1s- Europeans
jealously eyed the vast standardization of machine parts in America
begun by the forward-thinking Eli Whitney. 1ss

In 1878 William Gladstone warned: "While we have been advanc-
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ing with portentous rapidity, America is passing us as if in a canter.
There can hardly be a doubt, as between America and England, of the
belief that the daughter at no very distant time will, whether fairer or
less fair, be unquestionably yet stronger than the mother."1'6 With wide
ly read and quoted books such as Andrew Williamson's British
Industries and Foreign Competition (1894) or Fred McKenzie's
American Invaders (1902), the warning turned to mantra. In 1902
Brooks Adams, in American Economic Supremacy, declared the
American triumph afait accompli.'"
Nothing attested to American economic appeal like immigration.
The numbers are staggering: five million between 1815 and 1860;
another IO million by 1890; 23 million more by 1920. In 1917, one in
three Americans was an immigrant or the child of one. The vast major
ity flooded into America from Europe, and the lion's share of European
emigrants chose the United States over all other destinations. The
stream headed in the opposite direction (America to Europe) amounted
to a mere trickle (mainly of malcontented American intellectuals dis

gusted with America's philistine culture).m The almighty dollar alone
did not draw immigrants to America. The flow coninued
t
apace during
the recessions of 1856 and 1873. The newcomers came seeking as well
the distinctive American way of life. Most embraced American norms
and values and did their best to assimilate.

E pluribus unum

became a

near reality.u9 Though the extent of assimilation can be exaggerated,
certainly nothing like an Europeanization of America took place.
The love affair with America was not limited to immigrants. During
our period America's appeal expanded across the globe, including
Europe. Roughly speaking, American political institutions earned wide
spread admiration during the first three quarters of the nineteenth cen
tury only to be greatly overshadowed by American popular (that is, con
sumer) culture from the 1870s onward. The rebels ofTiananmen Square
were hardly the first to invoke America. People around the world chal
lenging despotism looked to America for inspiration and emulation.
South and Central Americans fortified themselves with the success of
the American War of Independence when throwing off the Spanish yoke
in the 1820s.
Though less successful, the organizers of the Decembrist Revolt of
1825 in Russia against the controversially installed Nicholas I saw
themselves as following in America's footsteps. The Australian dubbed
the USA in 1831 "a model for all new countries."160 Virtually all of the
revolutions that rocked Europe in 1848 had palpable American over-

72

Comparative Civilizations Review

tones.161 Seven editions of the American constitution were published
between April and September of 1848 in France alone.162 One Bohemian
rebel expressed the reigning enthusiasm: "Their political doctrines have
become the religion and confession of all countries, like the truths of
Christianity [and are] destined to become the universal faith of
mankind."163
Even the uppish British had to admit the popularity of the

terrible. Charles Darwin observed in

enfant

1859:

There is apparently much truth in the belief that the won
detful progress of the United States, as well as the charac
ter of the people, are the results of natural selection; the
more energetic, restless, and courageous men from all parts
of Europe having emigrated during the last ten or twelve
generations to that great country. . .All other series of events
- as that which resulted in the culture of mind in
Greece... and the empire of Rome - only appear to have
purpose and value when viewed in connection with, or
rather as subsidiary to...the great stream of Anglo-Saxon
emigration to the West.160
Twenty-nine years latet, James Bryce echoed the father of evolution.

The institutiOfis ofthe United States are deemed by inhabi
tants and admitted by strangers to be a matter of more gen
eral interest than those of the not less famous nations of the
Old World. . .for they are believed to disclose and display
the type of institutions towards which, as by a law of fate,
the rest of civilized mankind are forced to move, some with
swifter, others with slower, but all with unresting feet.165
By Bryce's time, however, American popular culture was already
upstaging American political institutions as the world's newest craze.
From Buffalo Bill through Mary Pickford and Mickey Mouse, the
American entertainment industry won loyal fans in Europe and beyond.
At the outbreak of the Great War, 90% of the motion pictures seen in
Britain were American. '66 The French were viewing 159 million feet of
American film per year by 1916. By the end of the war America pro
duced 85% of the world's films. 161 Hollywood's allure grew even
stronger in Europe after the war, prompting Bernard Shaw to chide the
American movie-making capital for "corrupting the world."168 The
French ambassador to Washington was more generous:

Your movies and talkies have soaked the French mind in
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American life, methods and manners

The place in French

...

life and culture formerly held by Spain and Italy, in the
nineteenth century by England, now belongs to America.
More and more we follow the Americans.'""

Prix uniques, the European version of Woolworth's, proliferated

across Europe between the wars.170 Jazz took the Continent by stonn.1'1

Europeans started using American colloquialisms like "gee."172
American fashions from shirtwaists to short skirts to pointed-toe shoes
came into vogue in Europe.
The exact origins of the notion "Americanization" elude us but by
the tum of the twentieth century it was uttered everywhere (in Europe
at least). Baudelaire was surely among the first coiners of the term when
he referred to his century as "Americanised by its zoocratic industrial
philosophers. "171 In 1870 his countryman, Edmond de Goncourt,
lamented that the Paris hotels were being "Americanized.""' "From the

1870s on," Fritz Stem relates, "conservative writers in imperial
Germany expressed fear that the German soul would be destroyed by
•Americanization,' that is by mammonism, materialism, mechanization
and mass society.""' Nietzsche, for instance, in the GayScience (1881),
maintained that America "is already beginning ferociously to infect old
Europe and is spreading a spiritual emptiness over the continent." "The
faith of the Americans today is more and more becoming the faith of the
European as well."176 Rudyard Kipling, who married an American, pre
dicted that America "will sway the world with one foot as a man tilts a
seesaw plank."177 So entrenched was the notion of Americanization that

fin de siecle psychiatric literature created a "nosological" category
called "Americanization," an illness of modem life.171
The idea thatAmericanization, as contemptuous as it may be, could
not be stopped, even in Europe, seized European intellectuals. Otto
Landendorf's Historical Subject Catalogue of 1906 claimed, "the
American, lacking ideals . . .will become the person of the future even in
Old Europe."179 In 1913 Elijah Brown forecast that Americanization
"seems destined to swallow up Europe."''° "We have absolutely no
choice any more," shrugged Theodor Luddecke between the wars. "The
American way of life is simply forced on us."111 Not just Europe lay
imperiled by the "American invasion."tn W1T. Stead published The

Americanization ofthe World in 1901. A Gennan contemporary warned,
"America represents a dreadful danger to all of humanity."m Georges

Duhamel echoed the same theme in America: The Menace (1931). A
year later compafriotAndre Siegfried claimed, "the United States is pre-
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siding at a general reorganization of the ways of living throughout the
entire world."11'

CONCLUSION

Permit me to use the conclusion to return to Brague and speculate

provocatively on the nature of modern European civilization. Brague
contends that Europe's sense of secondarity propels it to improve to an
extent other cultures do not exhibit. In contrast to more confident civi
lizations in the East, Europeans out of a sense of inferiority learned to
appreciate non-European cultures and learn from them in an effort to
advance Europe. Thus he writes, "the cultural poverty of Europe has
been her good fortune. It obliged it to work and to borrow. On the con
trary, the richness of Byzantium paralyzed it, got in its way, because it
had no need to look elsewhere ... no culture was ever so little centered
on itself and so interested in the other ones as Europe. China saw itself
as the 'Middle Kingdom.• Europe never did.''m This curiosity and open
ness explains Europe's progress in the modern epoch.
Without rejecting this idea of European opeMess, I claim that mod
em Europe developed a third sense of secondarity in relation to America
beyond that felt toward Jerusalem and Athens. I suggest that from 1776
on, America so distinguished itself in terms of potential and realized
greatness, albeit in the European imagination, that European elites
increasingly viewed the offspring as the (inevitable) geopolitical, eco
nomic and cultural center of the world. Put differently, America came to
represent not only a civilization with global reach, but more important
ly given Brague, one from which European intellectuals felt increasing
ly alienated. We see, then, in Europe's experience with America an
inversion of the relationship to Jerusalem and Athens. Whereas Europe
saw itself as secondary to the ancient civilizations and sedulously strug
gled to appropriate or even perfect them, it initially felt primary toward
America (its progenitor) but increasingly secondary as the progeny
matured and separated. A similar sense of secondarity, characterized by
feeling connected to the world's center but at the same time potentially
disconnected (and therefore irrelevant) emerged in modernity, iffor dif
ferent reasons, as it did in Antiquity and the Middle Ages. To use
Brague's label, Europe indeed was
tion on the edge.

and is eccentric, that

is, a civiliza
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